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Abstract.  In a multilevel security environment, the security levels form a hierarchy
which is generally assumed to be a lattice.  A user can see not only its own information,
but also information belonging to lower users.  In a multilevel security database, differ-
ent users have different beliefs (versions of information) about the same real world
object.  In this paper we present a relational model SecDB for multilevel security data.
We also present an SQL-like language SecSQL for querying security information.  For
a given level, a tuple consists of all the differing beliefs about the same real world
object.  Therefore, the model provides a built-in coherence to different beliefs of the
same real world object.  For an operator to be well defined, its application should pre-
serve beliefs and coherence.  This persistence of belief and coherence is achieved
through the concept of an anchor borrowed from an earlier work.  On one hand (in
addition to the usual database queries) SecSQL yields itself naturally to formulation of
security related queries, yet on the other hand the algebraic operators yield natural
identities which hold a good promise of algebraic optimization.  
Index terms.  Databases, security, database security, multilevel security, relational
databases, beliefs, belief data, dimensional databases.
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1. Introduction
In a multilevel security environment, the user levels form a hierarchy which is generally 
assumed to be a lattice.  Throughout this paper we assume that we are given an arbitrary finite lat-
tice Λ of users.  We use the terms user, security level, security class and user level interchange-
ably.  For the sake of simplicity one may assume that there is only one user at a given level.  In 
addition in multilevel security literature the term subject is also used for a user.  
As our running example we consider the lattice {αβ, α, β, λ}, as shown in Figure 1, together 
with the partial order ≤.  It may help the reader to think of αβ, α, β, λ as {α,β}, {α}, {β}, ∅, 
respectively, and ≤ as ⊆.         
Suppose u1 ≤  u2, then we say  u2 dominates u1, u2 is above u1, u1 is below u2 or u1 is domi-
nated by u2; in addition in the context of u1 we call u2 a higher user, and similarly, in the context 
of u2, we call u1 a lower user.  In the lattice of Figure 1, the user αβ dominates all users αβ, α, β 
and λ.   For a user u, the set of all users dominated by u is denoted as u−.  E.g. α− = {α,λ}.             
An object space is a set of objects in the real world.  In a multilevel security database, a user 
forms a belief about the object space: which objects exist in the real world, their identities and 
property values.  In other words a user has a subjective view of the object space and this subjec-
tive view is called object space of the user.  Information available to a user consists of the follow-
ing:
• An object space which is a belief about which objects exist in the real world.  Every object in an 
object space is identified by a key value, e.g. NAME and other property values.  Each user has its 
own object space, which is independent of the object spaces of other users.  
• All information available to lower users.  
• Knowledge of which object in user’s object space is known to a lower user, possibly with dif-
ferent identity (key) and property values.  
As an example suppose object space of αβ is {John, Mary}, and object space of α is {Inga, 
John, Tom}, as shown in Figure 2.  As stated above, the reader should keep in mind that the two 
object spaces are mutually independent.  Clearly, αβ believes that there are only two objects, 
whereas α believes there are three objects in the real world.  In addition αβ believes that John is 
known as Tom to α, Mary is unknown to α, and the objects known as Inga and John to α do not 
exist in the real world.  The user α is not aware of the user αβ or its object space.            
To maintain confidentiality of information, the upper user should not have write access to a 
lower user, and a lower user should not have read access to the upper user.  In a model for secure 
databases it is important that such access can not be created covertly by users through the facili-
ties available in the model.  In other words the model should avoid convert channels.  For exam-
Figure 1. A lattice Λ of security levels
β
αβ
λ
α
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ple, consider a model where a user requesting a tuple insertion gets a system rejection because a 
tuple belonging to a higher user with the same key already exists in the relation.  If this is permit-
ted, a user can misuse it to send one bit of information to a user with lower user.  
1.1. Dimensional data
  Dimensional data is a term given by us for any mix of ordinary, temporal, spatial and belief 
data, including multilevel security data.  Over last decade we have worked in dimensional data-
bases, attempting to unify different forms of dimensional data in a seamless framework.  We have 
published a series of papers in dimensional data in a variety of outlets.  (See references.)  We like 
to point out that we have consistently professed only one point of view, only one model, and only 
one language covering all forms of dimensional data, and that everything we have published in 
last decade is still our current view.  
Appendix A gives a brief summary of some of our research in dimensional databases.  It is 
mentioned how multilevel security will seamlessly integrate in our framework and readily avail 
the many advantages offered by our approach.  
1.2. Polyinstantiation in multilevel security and our works
Polyinstantiation refers to the ability of a database model to incorporate different beliefs about 
the same object in the real world.  A simplifying assumption that is prevalent in multilevel secu-
rity literature is the unikey assumption1.  The unikey assumption says that identity of an object at 
all levels is the same.  We term polyinstantiation under this assumption as u-polyinstantiation.  
The full form of polyinstantiation termed key-polyinstantiation would allow the freedom to use 
different keys at different levels for the same object.  A key under key-polyinstantiation is termed 
polykey.  
As shown in Figure 3(a), unikey is typically supported in multilevel security literature by hav-
ing multiple tuples for the same real world object.  In our model unikey is illustrated in Figure 
3(b) and 3(c); in each case a single tuple corresponds to an object in the real world.  In the first 
1. “Unikey assumption” is our term to explain nature of polyinstantiation prevalent in multilevel security lit-
erature, and also in our works in dimensional databases.  
John
Object space of user αβ
John
Mary
Inga Tom
Figure 2. Object spaces of users
Object space of user α
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case the tuple is in temporal databases, and in the second case it is a tuple in multilevel security.  
Clearly, whereas in multilevel security literature u-polyinstantiation is built at the relation level, in 
our model it is built at the tuple level.2          
[GY88], which articulated the concept of unikeys, is an interesting work in dimensional data.  
Unikeys work well for any mix of ordinary, temporal, and spatial data, and to this mix of dimen-
sional data the framework of [GY88] applies readily.  Although [GY88] was presented in the con-
text of temporal databases, the exercise of applying it to different forms of dimensional data is so 
straightforward, that we will refer to it as a generic work in dimensional data.  
Although polykeys are the defining characteristic of belief data, to the best of our knowledge 
only unikeys have been considered in the multilevel security literature.  Therefore [GY88] also 
readily applies to multilevel security with u-polyinstantiation.  As remarked above, unikeys in 
multilevel security literature are incorporated at the relation level, but in our case at tuple level.  
Because of this reason, [GY88] provides a cleaner framework to multilevel security databases.  
The advantage of [GY88] over existing models in multilevel security is the ease of querying.3  
2. Note that this would also apply to many works in temporal and spatial databases, although the concept of
unikey is well articulated in our works.  
3. See Examples 1 and 2 in Section 2.  There we compare querying in [GY88] and [WSQ94].  A reader is en-
couraged to try these and other queries in model of their choice, and in [GY88] to verify our claims.
              
(a) The usual (U-)polyinstantiation in multilevel security literature           
(b) U-polyinstantiation in our model of temporal data            
(c) U-polyinstantiation applied to our model 
Figure 3. Polyinstantiation in existing works in multilevel security
Name Salary Dept Level
John 50K Toys αβ
John 50K Shoes α
John 80K Toys β
John 90K PCs λ
NAME SALARY DEPT
[11,54] ∪ [60,75]
John
[11,50] 50K
[51,54] 80K
[60,75] 90K
[11,54] Toys
[60,63] Shoes
[64,75] PCs
NAME SALARY DEPT
{αβ,α,β,λ} John {αβ,α} 50K
{β} 80K
{λ} 90K
{αβ,β} Toys
{α} Shoes
{λ} PCs
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1.3. Supporting polykeys
As stated above, polykeys are defining characteristic of belief data, including multilevel secu-
rity data.  Whereas to the best of knowledge polykeys have not been considered in multilevel 
security literature, we have extensively studied polykeys in evolutionary beliefs [GB89].  In evo-
lutionary belief data, a user forms different beliefs about a fixed momentary state of a  real world 
object at different times.  Obtaining a model supporting polykeys, as cleanly as [GY88] supports 
unikeys, is quite non-trivial.  We will discuss polykeys in Section 3, where we will also motivate 
our model for multilevel security.         
Key-polyinstantiation is a delicate concept and demands a careful consideration.  Without 
proper support for key-polyinstantiation the SQL-like framework can become unreliable, user 
unfriendly and inefficient.  The lack of reliability arises from the fact that the correct values and 
incorrect values have to coexist in a belief database, and the incorrect values can assume the role 
of keys destroying the identity of objects.  It can be shown that even simple algebraic identities 
such as commutativity of selection with union will cease to hold without proper support of key-
polyinstantiation.  Due to lack of natural identities, the language can become more imperative and 
less declarative.   This is shown for multilevel security data in Section 3.  Besides making the 
query language less natural, the lack of identities also reduce opportunities for algebraic optimiza-
tion.  Theses problems are contrary to the rich spirit of the relational model, and can bring the 
database modeling of belief data to the brink of failure irrespective of the choice of the database 
paradigm.  
In [GB89], key-polyinstantiation is supported by adding an anchor to a dimensional value.  An 
anchor is essentially “the correct” belief.  For evolutionary objects, the current knowledge of 
name, say John, can be used as an anchor.  Adding an anchor is like having your cake and it too.  
On one hand we have polykeys, because all differing beliefs about the key are still present.  On 
the other hand the anchor is a unique value, and it amounts to having a unikey.  Once we have uni-
keys, belief data starts to behave like spatial and temporal data.  
1.4. Our objective
Our objective is to give a model supporting key-polyinstantiation in multilevel security data-
bases that works without loosing reliability, user friendliness and opportunities for algebraic opti-
mization4.  
1.5. Our approach and its novelty
This paper may be viewed as an exercise in extending [GY88] to polykeys.  In this goal [GB89] 
guides us.  However a reader should note that evolutionary beliefs and multilevel security data are 
far from being isomorphic, and a model for one does not readily work for the other.  In other 
words, the work in this paper is novel, and it goes over and beyond [GY88,GB89].   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss other works and discuss 
why [GY88] provides a superior framework for querying multilevel security data.  In Section 3, 
we discuss the nature of polykeys and motivate our model for multilevel security.  In Section 4, 
we give formal details for the model.  In Section 5 we present a query language for this model.  
4. We have a clean and comprehensive framework for optimization in dimensional databases.  But that topic
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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We conclude in Section 6.  Appendix A gives a summary of some of our research in dimensional 
databases.         
2. Existing works in multilevel security and [GY88]
To the best of our knowledge, existing works in multilevel security only support unikeys.  Some 
of the papers [JS90, JS91, DLS87, HOT91] have proposed syntactic integrity rules to avoid or 
interpret polyinstantiation.  [CS95] is a relatively more recent paper in this area, and it seems to 
draw ideas from numerous sources including [DLS88, LDS90, HOT91, JS90, JS91, SW92].  That 
paper proposes a model and incorporates several semantic requirements which are added as con-
straints.  These constraints become necessary in existing models (including [CS95]) because of 
the scheme and object fragmentation.  In our model most of these constraints become redundant, 
or reduce to the classical model. 
[PMP94] gives a model for integrating temporal and multilevel security data.  Such integration 
is much tighter and naturally built at attribute level in our dimensional model.  
The MLS model [SW92]
As illustrated in Figure 4, the model in [SW92] adds two attributes KC and TC (called key clas-
sification and tuple classification, respectively) to a classical relation.  KC and TC values are lev-
els, such that KC ≤ TC.  A 〈Name, Dept, Salary, KC, TC〉 tuple expresses that the information 
〈Name, Dept, Salary〉 belongs to KC and TC concurs with it.  Both tuples in the figure represent 
the belief 〈Tom, 10K, Shoes〉 of α.  The TC-values α and αβ in the two tuples say that α and αβ 
concur with this belief.  In the context of the second tuple we also say that αβ draws the informa-
tion 〈Tom, 10K, Shoes〉 belonging to α.  Information drawing is also built in our model to be pre-
sented in this paper.         
[GQ95] gives ramifications of information drawing under update operators.  (The concept of 
information drawing is mentioned above.)  Those issues are only of peripheral importance to this 
paper, which mainly concentrates on querying.  In our model the issues articulated in [GQ95] 
either do not arise, or have natural solutions.   [BKS95] provides a deductive framework for mul-
tilevel security.  A discussion of that work is beyond the scope of this paper.  
A model by Winslett, Smith and Qian [WSQ94]
[WSQ94] gives a model where labeling of beliefs is done in a somewhat complicated way.  On 
one hand the thesis of that work seems to be subsumed by [GY88], and on the other hand [GY88] 
gives a cleaner formulation because of its ability to capture u-polyinstantiation at the tuple level.  
Below we consider a couple of examples drawn from [WSQ94], adopted to our emp relation.  The 
              
Figure 4. Tuples in a relation in [SW92]
Name Salary Dept KC TC
Tom 100K Shoes α α
Tom 100K Shoes α αβ
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reader may informally think of Self and Anyone as two syntactic relations: at a given level L, Self 
evaluates to the singleton {L}, and Anyone evaluates to the set of all levels, L and below, denoted 
as L− in our notation.  The point of these examples is to invite a reader to compare the complexity 
of queries in [WSQ94] and our queries, had we used the framework of [GY88].  
Example 1.  Consider the query list all names everyone believes to exist.  This query is expressed 
as follows in algebras of [WSQ94] and [GY88] type model.  Note that Self and Anyone in 
[WSQ94] query have been explained above.  U in our query denotes the set of all users.
[WSQ94] ΠNAME (emp) − ΠNAME (ΠNAME (emp) × Anyone − ((ΠNAME (emp) × Self) ↓ Anyone))
[GY88] type model: ΠNAME σ(emp, [[NAME]] = U, ) 
Example 2.  The query list employee names believed at my level but no lower level below me, is 
expressed in [WSQ94] and our SQL as follows.
[WSQ94]: select NAME 
from emp 
where NAME not in (select NAME 
from emp 
believed by ( select LEVEL 
from Anyone
where LEVEL not in ( select
from self)))
[GY88] type model: select NAME
from emp e5
where [[e]] = me
It should be clear from above examples that [GY88] provides a user-friendly framework for 
multilevel security.  For further confirmation of our claims, a reader is invited to try some queries 
in any existing model for multilevel security and in [GY88] like framework.  
3. Key-polyinstantiation  
As stated before unikeys are inadequate for belief data.  Polykeys are the defining characteristic 
of belief data where identity of a given real world object may vary from belief to belief.  The con-
cept of key-polyinstantiation for belief data was formulated by us in [GB89] in the context of evo-
lutionary beliefs.  Key-polyinstantiation also arises in multilevel security.  The polykeys in these 
two cases of belief share some similarities, but they are not isomorphic; therefore, a model for one 
doses not automatically extend to the other.  
3.1. Evolutionary beliefs and key-polyinstantiation.  
A person known as John today may be considered a case of mistaken identity in future, and the 
same person may be believed to be Tom.  Yet, at another point in future one may realize that there 
was a misunderstanding, and the person’s name was in fact John.  There is no bound on how many 
times such misunderstandings may occur.  Thus for the same object in the real world, our knowl-
edge of its name changes with time.  Clearly we have key-polyinstantiation here.  A model for 
evolutionary data with key-polyinstantiation was given by us in [GB89].  Figure 5 shows a key-
5. Note “emp e” creates alias e of the emp relation; this is not a cross product of emp and e
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polyinstantiated tuple in evolutionary beliefs.    
3.2. Key-polyinstantiation in multilevel security data.  
Key-polyinstantiation also arises in multilevel security databases (see Figure 2).  An object 
known as John to one user may be known as Tom to another user.  Although through our work in 
[GB89]6 we know how to deal with key-polyinstantiation in evolutionary beliefs, it turns out that 
in multilevel security keys are nested.  This is illustrated is the following example, which essen-
tially runs through the rest of this section ( Section 3).  
Example 3.  Consider the lattice of users {αβ, α, β, λ} as in Figure 1.  Recall that each of the four 
users has an object space which is independent of the object spaces of the other users.  The entire 
belief of αβ about an object John is shown in Figure 6(a).  Explanation of  Figure 6(a) follows.          
First, we concentrate on part (i) of Figure 6(a).  Each edge from a higher user to lower user 
expresses a belief of the higher user about how an object known to it is known to the lower user.  
For example, the edge from αβ:John to α:Tom expresses αβ’s belief that the object known to it as 
John is known to α as Tom.  User α is not even aware of the existence of user αβ, let alone the 
above relationship.  However, α is aware of the user λ, and as shown in the figure, α believes that 
the object known to it as Tom is known to λ as Hari.  The important observation we make now is 
that αβ does not believe the belief of α, and αβ thinks that the object known to it as John is known 
as Ron to λ and not as Hari.  The reader is highly encouraged to examine all the ramifications of 
the complexity of beliefs inherent in multilevel security data.  It should also be clear to the reader 
that whereas polykey in evolutionary beliefs have a flat structure, the polykeys in multilevel 
beliefs are nested.  
 Now we consider part (ii) of Figure 6(a) which captures the salary of the object known as John 
to αβ.  The backward arrow from the higher user αβ to β says that the salary at level αβ is drawn 
from the salary at β.  In part (iii) of Figure 6(a) we see transitive drawing. 7  
3.3. Operators can destroy polykeys
As stated before, key-polyinstantiation for evolutionary beliefs was introduced in [GB89].  As 
key-polyinstantiation is the fundamental characteristic of belief data, [GB89] is an interesting 
work in belief data.  Key-polyinstantiation is a delicate concept and demands a careful consider-
ation.  Without proper support for key-polyinstantiation the SQL-like framework can become 
6. No term was given to key polyinstantiation in that paper.  
7. In this paper we do not go through all the different ramifications about drawing of information.  The read-
er is invited to give reasons as to why this transitivity makes sense.   
         
Figure 5. Key-polyinstantiation in our model for evolutionary belief data
NAME SALARY DEPT
[11,40] John
[41,54] Tom
[60,75] John
[11,50] 50K
[51,54] 80K
[60,75] 90K
[11,54] Toys
[60,63] Shoes
[64,75] PCs
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λ: Ron
α: Tom β: John
(i) Object named John
λ: Hari
αβ: John
λ: 75K
α: 85Κ: β: 60K
(ii) John’s salary
λ: 70K
αβ: 
λ: Toys
α: β: PCs
(iii) John’s department
λ: Shoes
αβ: 
                                
(b) Our storage model for polyinstantiation of the object John
         
(c) The query content of the first tuple from (b)
               
(d) The tuple of (c) after anchoring
Figure 6. An object named John known to αβ
NAME SALARY DEPT
{αβ,β} John
{α} Tom
{λ} Ron
{αβ} ↑β {αβ} ↑α
{α} Tom
{λ} Hari
{α} 85K {α} ↑λ
{β} John
{λ} Ron
{β} 60K {β} PCs
{λ} Hari {λ} 70K {λ} Shoes
{λ} Ron {λ} 75K {λ} Toys
NAME SALARY DEPT
{αβ,β} John
{α} Tom
{λ} Ron
{αβ,β} 60K
{α} 85K
{λ} 75K
{αβ,α} Shoes
{β} PCs
{λ} Toys
NAME SALARY DEPT
αβ John {αβ,β} John
{α} Tom
{λ} Ron
αβ 60K {αβ,β} 60K
{α} 85K
{λ} 75K
αβ Shoes {αβ,α} Shoes
{β} PCs
{λ} Toys
(a) Information about John available to αβ
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unreliable, user unfriendly and inefficient.  The lack of reliability arises from the fact that the cor-
rect values and incorrect values have to coexist in a belief database, and the incorrect values can 
assume the role of keys destroying the identity of objects.  It can be shown that even simple alge-
braic identities such as commutativity of selection with union will cease to hold without proper 
support of u-polyinstantiation.  Due to lack of natural identities, the language can become more 
imperative and less declarative.   This is shown for multilevel security data later in this section.  
Besides making the query language less natural, the lack of identities also reduce opportunities for 
algebraic optimization.  From our point of view, these problems are contrary to the rich spirit of 
the relational model, and can bring the database modeling of belief data to the brink of failure irre-
spective of the choice of the database paradigm.  
In [GB89], key-polyinstantiation is supported by adding an anchor to a dimensional value.  An 
anchor is essentially “the correct” belief.  For evolutionary objects, the current knowledge of 
name, say John, can be used as an anchor.  Adding an anchor is like having your cake and it too.  
On one hand we have polykeys, because all differing beliefs about the key are still present.  On 
the other hand the anchor is a unique value, and it amounts to having a unikey.  Once we have uni-
keys, belief data starts to behave like spatial and temporal data.  
Figure 6(b) shows the tuples which capture the information content of Figure 6(a).  These tuples 
represent the storage structure for the information contained in them.  Figure 6(c) shows the full 
query contents of (only) the first tuple from Figure 6(b).  Note that in this paper we incorporate 
key-polyinstantiation at the relation level and not at the tuple level. 8    
3.4.   Anchors 
To illustrate anchors, we will use the Name attribute value in the tuple of Figure 6(c) as our run-
ning example.  For ease of reference it is also shown in Figure 7(a).       
The purpose of an anchor is to provide a unikey at the relation level.  In case of the belief in 
Figure 7(a), the unikey would be 〈αβ John〉: which says “this is αβ’s belief about the object John 
in its (αβ’s) object space”.  This unikey should serve us well, because it is capable of distinguish-
ing this belief from a belief of user α about an object John in α’s object space.9  An anchor is 
nothing but this unikey; Figure 7(b) shows belief value of Figure 7(a) after anchoring.  
8. Figure 6(d).  Note that we can represent all the different tuples in Figure 6(d) by using path expressions
such as αβ.β.λ the points in the dimensional space, but this gives rise to some other complications.  This
may be treated in our future publications.
9. We note that in evolutionary beliefs, a user is concerned with its own beliefs at different times.  Therefore
〈John〉 would suffice as the unikey.  
Figure 7. The NAME value of Figure 6(c) with and without anchor
(b) Value with anchor
NAME
αβ John {αβ,β} John
{α} Tom
{λ} Ron
(a) Value without anchor
NAME
{αβ,β} John
{α} Tom
{λ} Ron
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3.5. Anchors make algebraic operators meaningful
The information in belief data can be fragile when algebraic operators are applied.  Now we dis-
cuss how anchors can be used to protect the identity of objects from destruction due to algebraic 
operators.  We illustrate the use of anchors through an example.  We informally consider a selec-
tion of the form σ(r, µ).  The selection retrieves the functional restriction of relation r to domain µ.  
Next consider the following algebraic identity.  
σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) = σ(r, µ∪ν) 
Intuitively a user expects this algebraic identity to hold.  First we use the unanchored value in 
Figure 7(a) and carry on a naive computations and show that it will fail to yield the algebraic iden-
tity.  Then we use the anchored value in Figure 7(b), and use it as a keying mechanism and show 
how the algebraic identity is obtained.  We will use the following values for r, µ and ν:   
• For r we will use the single object of Figure 7.  (In other words r is a single attribute single tuple 
relation.)  
• µ = {α,β}
• ν = {β,λ}           
Naive computation.  In this case r is the un-anchored object of Figure 7(a).  The naive compu-
tations are shown in Figure 8(a).  Starting with r, we compute σ(r, µ), σ(r, ν), σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) and 
σ(r, µ∪ν).  From parts (iii) and (iv) of Figure 8(a), it is clear that σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) and σ(r, µ∪ν) 
are not equal; they don't even have the same number of tuples!            
Figure 8. Persistence of identities with anchors
(Note that µ = {α,β}, and ν = {β,λ})
(a) Without anchoring σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r,ν) ≠ σ(r, µ∪ν)
(b) With anchoring σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) = σ(r, µ∪ν)
(i) σ(r, µ) (ii) σ(r, ν) (iii) σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r,ν) (iv) σ(r, µ∪ν)
NAME
{α}  Tom
{β}  John
NAME
{β}  John
{λ}  Ron
NAME
{α}  Tom
{β}  John
{β}  John
{λ}  Ron
NAME
{α}  Tom
{β}  John
{λ}  Ron
(i) σ(r, µ)
  
(ii) σ(r, ν) 
  
(iii)σ(r, µ)∪σ(r, ν), σ(r, µ∪ν)
NAME
αβ John {α}  Tom
{β}  John
NAME
αβ John {β}  John
{λ}  Ron
NAME
αβ John {α}  Tom
{β}  John
{λ}  Ron
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Computation with anchors.  In this case r is the anchored object of Figure 7(b).  Figure 8(b) 
shows computations with anchors.  With anchoring, the results of σ(r, µ), σ(r, ν), σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) 
and σ(r, µ∪ν) are also shown.   Note that when the system computes union (in this case σ(r, µ) ∪ 
σ(r, ν)), the collapse of two tuples is with respect to their anchors.  This permits the restoring of an 
object (belief) in a single tuple after it is decomposed into several tuples.  It is clear that Figure 
8(b)(iii) shows the result of σ(r, µ) ∪ σ(r, ν) as well as σ(r, µ∪ν).  
3.6. Anchoring is done by the system
Our goal is to design a query language which is as natural for a user as possible.  In order to 
achieve this we favor passing the complexities of belief data on to the system.  Anchors help us in 
meeting this non-trivial objective.  We note that anchoring is done automatically by the system 
before executing a query.  The user makes no effort in the underlying process to carry out the 
algebraic computations.      
3.7. Partitioned associative navigation
In databases the construct AθB is of fundamental importance.  In the conventional 1nf 
approach, the attribute values A and B are atomic, therefore, AθB evaluates to TRUE or FALSE.  In 
our dimensional models, A and B are functions, and A(p)θB(p) is TRUE at some points p and 
FALSE at others.  Therefore, the appropriate counterpart of AθB in our dimensional models is 
[[AθB]], which computes the set of points p where A(p)θB(p) holds.  In other words, in dimen-
sional data, [[AθB]] is a domain expression and not a boolean expression.  
Though in our existing dimensional models the above definition of [[AθB]] is satisfactory, in 
security data we need to reexamine this in the context of anchors.  We could have the following 
two options:  
• Define [[AθB]] as above, i.e. {p: A(p)θB(p) holds} 
• Define [[AθB]] more conservatively as {p: beliefs A and B belong to the same user and 
A(p)θB(p) holds}
The second choice is more natural for multilevel security; it keeps the object spaces belonging 
to different users partitioned as associative navigation is done.  Perhaps the best justification for 
such a choice can be given in terms of natural join.  For instance consider Example 8 where the 
natural join (equi-join to be exact) [[emp.DEPT = management.DEPT]] is used.  It is clear that the 
partitioned computation would yield a natural result.
In the next section we give formal details for our model.  The model keeps object spaces of dif-
ferent levels partitioned.  Such partitioning is build from ground up, applying it to domains, val-
ues, tuples and associative navigation.
4. The model SecDB: Formal details
In this section we give the formal details for our model.  As stated at the end of the previous 
section, the model keeps object spaces of different levels partitioned.  Such partitioning is build 
from ground up.
A security element µ is a subset of the Λ, the lattice of all users.  A security element allows us to 
represent a user’s knowledge about a real world object.  Clearly, the set of all security elements is 
closed under union, intersection and complementation.  These closure properties lay a foundation 
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for uniform handling of “or”, “and” and “not” of natural languages in a query language [GN93].  
A u-element is a subset of  u−.  An example of an αβ-element is {αβ, α, λ}.  The purpose of this 
security element is to allow the user αβ, to assemble a belief about a real world object known to 
αβ (ownself), α and λ.  The u-elements are closed under union, intersection.  The u-elements are 
also closed under complementation when the complementation is computed with respect to u−.  
A u-assignment to an attribute A is a function ξ from a u-element into dom(A), the domain of 
A.  For example, 〈{αβ,α} Jack, {β} John, {λ} Tom〉  is an αβ-assignment to the attribute NAME.  
Whereas, in the conventional 1nf approach, an attribute value in existing multilevel security mod-
els capture information pertaining to only one level of a belief, in our model we assemble the 
entire information about a belief in a (single) attribute value.  The non-1nf nature of our tuples 
makes a substantial simplification in user queries [GN93].  The domain of ξ is denoted as [[ξ]].  
For example, [[〈{αβ,α} Jack, {β} John, {λ} Tom〉]] = {αβ, α, β, λ}.       
Now we formalize the concept of anchor.  First we discuss anchored domains, and then 
anchored (attribute) values.  The purpose of anchors is to provide persistence to identity of an 
object while it undergoes an algebraic operation.  Our definitions also keep operands partitioned 
at various levels.  The level L is indicated by the prefix “L:”. 
4.1. Anchored security elements
We assume that we have an attribute A in mind, and dom(A) denotes domain of A.  An 
anchored u-element is an ordered pair ({u}, µ), where µ is a subset of u−.  For ease of readability, 
we denote a u-element ({u}, µ) as u:µ.      
Example 4.  αβ:{αβ, α, λ} is an anchored αβ-element; its anchor is αβ and its domain is {αβ, α, 
λ}.  Another example of an anchored element is β:{λ}, but β:{α}is not an anchored element, 
because α is not below β.     
Now, we define union, intersection and complementation of anchored u-elements for a fixed 
value of u.  Basically, for a fixed anchor u, these operations are performed on the domains, with 
the u− as the universe.  For example, 
αβ:{α, λ} ∪ αβ:{β, λ} = αβ:{α, β, λ}
αβ:{α, λ} ∩ αβ:{β, λ} = αβ:{λ}
αβ:{α, λ} − αβ:{β, λ}) = αβ:{α}
 − αβ:{α, λ} = αβ:{αβ,β}
 − α:{α, λ} = α:∅
It is clear that the above definitions provide each user u, a space of anchored elements which are 
closed under union, intersection and complementation.  However, this definition is not an end in 
itself.  It is not our intention to have different relations for different users.  A relation r is shared by 
all users and we want to be able to compute its domain.  
An anchored domain µ is a (finite) set of anchored u-elements, such that for a given user u, 
there is at most one u-element in µ.  This definition forces different u-elements for the same value 
of u to be coalesced together.  The union, intersection and complementation among anchored 
domains is defined naturally.  
Example 5.  The following is an example show how the user αβ may perform union, intersection 
and complementation among anchored domains.    
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{αβ:{α, λ}, β:{λ}} ∪ {αβ:{β, λ}, α:{α,λ}} = {αβ:{α, β, λ}, α:{α,λ}, β:{λ}}
{αβ:{α, λ}, β:{λ}} ∩ {αβ:{β, λ}, α:{α,λ}} = {αβ:{λ}, α:∅, β:∅} = {αβ:{λ}}
{αβ:{α, λ}, β:{λ}} − {αβ:{β, λ}, α:{α,λ}} = {αβ:{α}, β:{λ}}
− {αβ:{α, λ}, β:{λ}} = {αβ:{αβ, β}, α:{α,λ}, β:{β}, λ:{λ}}
− {β:{λ}} = {αβ:{αβ, α, β, λ}, α:{α,λ}, β:{β}, λ:{λ}}
Example 6.  The user β is unaware of αβ and α.  Therefore, the user β will see the following part 
of the last identity in the previous example.  
− {β:{λ}} = {β:{β}, λ:{λ}}
It is easily verified that union, intersection and complementation satisfy properties of a boolean 
algebra at every step of the definition.  As all our definitions in dimensional databases, these defi-
nitions are designed to arrive at a query language which is easy to use.  
The last definition will allow us to compute [[r]], the domain of a relation.  The operator [[r]] is 
of fundamental importance in dimensional databases.  It allows us to capture the concept of 
“when” in a temporal database, “where” in a spatial database, and “when and where” in a spatio-
temporal database.  In those databases, the definition of [[r]] is very simple.  [[r]] plays a fundamen-
tal role in the syntax of our SQL-like algebraic query language.  On one hand it makes the syntax 
highly recursive and natural, and on the other hand it allows users to express “selections” from 
natural languages as selections  instead of joins in our query language.   In multilevel security, the 
definition of [[r]] is complex compared to other forms of dimensional data.  It allows us to capture 
“who” in a secure manner.  We remark that the said complexity in the definition of [[r]] is not 
passed on to the user, but rather it is absorbed by the system.      
4.2. Anchored attribute values 
A u-anchor over A, or simply an anchor is a function from a singleton {u} to dom(A).   An 
anchored u-assignment with the anchored  u-element u:µ as its domain, is a pair of functions 
(ξa,ξv), denoted ξa:ξv, where ξa is a u-anchor,  and ξv is a function from u− into dom(A) such that 
if ξv is defined at u, it has to agree with ξa.  The domain of ξa:ξv, denoted [[ξa:ξv]] is defined as the 
anchored domain [[ξa]]:[[ξv]].   We revisit our example from  Section  3.4.   
Example 7.  The attribute value 〈{αβ,β} John, {α} Tom, {λ} Ron〉 belonging to user αβ after 
anchoring becomes 〈αβ John: {αβ,β} John, {α} Tom, {λ} Ron〉.  Figure 7(b) shows a tabular rep-
resentation of this anchored attribute value.  In addition the domain of the anchored value is  
αβ:{αβ,α,β,λ}.    
4.3. Associative navigation
Motivation for this has already been given at the end of previous section.  Here we merely 
restate that [[AθB]] is defined as {p: beliefs A and B belong to the same user and A(p)θB(p) 
holds}.  The requirement “beliefs A and B belong to the same user” keeps the object spaces parti-
tioned.  
4.4. Tuples   
A u-tuple, or simply a tuple is a concatenation of u-assignments whose security domains are the 
same. The assumption that all u-assignments in a tuple have the same domain is called the homo-
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geneity assumption [GN93].  Note that in all the existing models, security level is used as an 
attribute, and thus tuples in these models are a priori homogeneous.  Thus, the homogeneity 
assumption does not limit our modeling power when compared to the existing approaches. Figure 
6(d) shows example of an employee tuple over NAME SALARY DEPT, with NAME as its key.  This 
tuple belongs to the user αβ.  The tuple represents a single real world object, known as John to the 
users αβ and β, as Tom to α, and as Ron to λ.   
4.5. Relations
A relation r over a scheme R, with K⊆R as its key, is a finite set of non-empty homogeneous 
tuples such that for a given level, no two tuples can have the same key.  
5. The query language SecSQL
In this section we give a brief introduction to SecSQL, the query language for our model.  
Expressions in SecSQL can be divided into three mutually exclusive groups: domain expressions 
which evaluate to security elements, boolean expressions which evaluate to TRUE and FALSE, and 
relational expressions which evaluate to security relations.  The most interesting operator in Sec-
SQL is its SQL-like select statement.  The select statement draws its simplicity and power through 
associative navigation made possible by domain expressions and boolean expressions.  In this 
section we primarily concentrate upon the SQL-like select statement of SecSQL and giving sev-
eral examples.  
• [[AθB]] is a domain expression which extracts users where A and B are in θ-relationship.  For 
example, if A is the security assignment 〈αβ a1: {αβ} a1, {α} a2, {λ} a3〉, and B is 〈αβ a1: 
{αβ} a1, {α} a2, {β} a3〉, then [[A=B]] evaluates to αβ:{αβ,α}. 
• If e is a relational expression, then [[e]] is a domain expression, whose value is the union of 
domains of tuples in the relation computed by e.  For example, [[emp]] is {αβ:{αβ,α,β,λ}, 
α:{α,λ}, β:{β}, λ:{λ}}.  This construct is a source of powerful nesting among SecSQL 
expressions.  It can also be used by itself as a query. 
• [[AθB]] and [[e]] are atomic domain expressions, they evaluate to security elements.  If µ and 
ν are domain expressions, then so are µ∪ν, µ∩ν, µ−ν and ¬µ.  
• If µ and ν are domain expressions, then µ⊆ν is a boolean expression.  
• We define AθB to be an abbreviation of the boolean expression [[AθB]] ≠ ∅.  
• If f and g are boolean expressions then so are f∨g, f∧g and ¬f.
The select statement
The select statement of SeqSQL is the most interesting one.  It is similar to the select statement 
in SQL.  The main difference is the addition of the “restricted to µ” clause which allows the 
retrieval of a tuple to be restricted to the domain specified by the domain expression µ.  In Sec-
SQL it has the following form. 
select X: K
restricted_to µ
from r1, r2, ⋅⋅⋅ , rn
where f
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5.1. Query examples
We assume a database called PersonnelDB.  The database consists of two relations: emp (NAME 
SALARY DEPT) and management (DEPT MANAGER).  We assume that NAME is the key of emp, and 
DEPT is the key of management.  We also assume that DEPT and MANAGER functionally determine 
each other.  Note that in our model we do not need any additional attributes beyond those in a 
classical relation, yet our modeling power extends the existing models in multilevel security.  Not 
all data is visible to every user.  A user at level u can query all tuples at level u and below.   
We use ME to represent the level of the user.  Therefore, ME will be substituted by the user 
(level) who submits the query.  Also recall that u− denotes the set of all users below u (including 
u).  
Example 8.  (For user αβ)  Give managers of all employees in all object spaces.  
select NAME, emp.DEPT, management.MANAGER
from emp, management
restricted_to [[emp.DEPT = management.DEPT]]       
This is basically a natural join of emp and management, except that the attribute SALARY is not 
projected.  The user complexity of the query is comparable to a classical query.  10   
Example 9.  (For any user)  Give managers of those employees known only to me.  
select NAME, management.MANAGER
from emp, management
restricted_to [[emp.DEPT = management.DEPT]] 
where [[NAME]] = ME:{ME}
Example 10.  (For user ≥ α)  Give the identities believed by α of objects in user α’s object space.  
select  NAME
restricted_to α:{α}
from  emp
Example 11.  (For user ≥ α)  Give all identities of objects in user α’s object space.  
select  NAME
restricted_to α:α−
from  emp
Example 12.  (For any user)  Give the identities of object “John”  in my object space.  
select  NAME
from  emp
where ME:ME−  ∩ [[NAME=John]] ≠ ∅ 
Example 13.  (For any user)  Give all objects in my object space which have the identity “John” 
at any level.    
10. Note that the conservative choice for [[AθB]], [[emp.DEPT = management.DEPT]] in this case (see 2nd
bullet in Section 4.3) manages to keep the object spaces of all users partitioned yielding a satisfactory result.
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select  *
from  emp
where ME:{ME} ⊆ [[NAME]] and [[NAME=John]] ≠ ∅
Example 14.  (For any user)  Give the security points at which the identity “John” exists.     
[[select * restricted_to [[name=John]] from emp]]
Example 15.  (For any user)  Give the identities of objects in the whole object spaces, restricting 
to the security points at which the identity “John” exists in some object space.  Note that the 
query of Example 14 is nested here. 
select NAME
restricted_to [[select * restricted_to [[Name=John]] from emp]]
from emp
Example 16.  (For any user)  Give the identities of the employees known only to my level.    
select *
from emp
where [[NAME]] = ME:{ME}
Example 17.  (For any user)  Give the identities of the employees known to every level.    
select *
from emp
where [[NAME]] = ME:ME−
Example 18.  (For any user ≥ α)  Give all objects, in my object space, of which the names 
believed by level α and λ are the same.  Note that |NAME(ΜΕ:α)| retrieves the name after stripping 
the security point ΜΕ:α; | ⋅ | is a “read only operation” being used in a comparison here.  In our 
model a value cannot be written after stripping its security point, except in a terminal situation 
such as printing a report for human consumption.  
select *
from emp
where |NAME((ΜΕ:α))| = |NAME((ΜΕ:λ))|
6. Conclusion
It should be clear from our query examples that we have successfully incorporated polykeys in 
our model for multilevel security data.  In particular a reader is welcome to examine query in 
Example 8, and think through all that is implicit in it and the central fact that the complexity of the 
query is comparable to the classical case.  Operators in our model for multilevel security turn out 
to be more robust than their counterpart in evolutionary beliefs [GB89].  A discussion of this point 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  The techniques used in [GB89] gave us some ideas but they 
needed substantial changes before they became applicable to multilevel security.  
The major strength of our approach is the ease of query for a user, and in addition the fact that 
the user never has to worry about cooking up information, e.g. inadvertently splicing a belief of a 
user to a different user.  
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We feel that this paper provides the most powerful and most user-friendly framework of all 
existing approaches to multilevel security.   Imposition of constraints in the existing security data-
base models seems to be necessary because of schema and object fragmentation.11  Our model 
avoids such fragmentation: our relational schemes are same as those in classical relational data-
bases (we do not need attributes such as “TC, tuple classification”), and our tuples are richer in 
information content.  Because of these reasons, most of the constraints appearing in the security 
literature are built-in our model.  A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.   
Our approach in dimensional data has lead to seamless integration of ordinary, spatial, temporal 
and multilevel security data.  A summary of the advantages offered by our approach is given in 
Appendix A; multilevel security could benefit from these advantages. 
  The prevailing folk wisdom in databases recognizes two important constructors in databases: 
tuple constructor and set constructor.  We feel that there is much to be gained by adding the 
dimension constructor to this list.  The various forms of seamlessness, uniformity and scalability 
of our SQL like language represent a promise to industry and users for a smooth transition from 
classical databases to temporal, spatial and security databases with oids and type hierarchy.  
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APPENDIX A
Features of our dimensional model: the big picture where this work fits
We have presented a model and an SQL like language to query and update belief information 
for a multilevel security database.  The model has been developed within the framework of our on 
going research in dimensional data [NG92], [CGN93], [GNP92], [CG94], [BG93], [Ga88], 
[GY88], [GV85], [GB89], [Ch95], [GN93].  Under the banner of dimensional data we have uni-
fied ordinary, temporal, spatial and belief data.  Considerable research has already been done in 
dimensional databases.  Following is a list of some of the features of dimensional databases which 
need to be studied to see how well these features continue to hold when security is added as a 
dimension under our approach.
• Dimensional seamlessness and query reuse.  Our SQL like query languages have so far 
remained essentially independent of the choice of the dimensional data.  The seamless integra-
tion of the different forms of dimensional data is achieved through the concept of dimension 
alignment, which allows a query on a form of dimensional data (e.g., a temporal query) to be 
used literally without any change in higher forms of dimensional data (e.g., spatio-temporal) 
[CGN93].  We expect this feature to extend to security data; thus e.g. one should be able to use 
a security query for temporal data in a security-spatio-temporal database without any changes.        
• Boolean seamlessness.  The constructs “or,”  “and”  and “not” of natural languages are incor-
porated symmetrically in our SQL.  Such a seamlessness is not possible in existing models of 
dimensional data because in these models the dimensional domain such as security level is used 
as a column in a relation [GN93].     
• Fewer joins.  In our model the number of joins one needs are comparable to those in classical 
databases.  In existing models of temporal, spatial and security databases the database represen-
tation of a real world object is often fragmented into a potentially unbounded number of frag-
ments.  This makes those query languages more difficult for users; before a query can be 
formulated, unnecessary joins have to be performed in order to paste different fragments 
together.  In this context, the construct [[r]] of our model is very useful.  It allows a relational 
expression to be turned into a domain expression, which can be nested in a relational or boolean 
expression.  This construct is natural as well as powerful.  It allows natural language selection 
to be realized as selections in our algebra [GN93].  The construct is also very efficient to imple-
ment.    
• Algebraic query optimization.  Because of fewer joins the queries in our algebra tend to be 
more efficient.  But in addition, dimensional data give rise to interesting algebraic identities 
which provide a foundation for algebraic optimization [NG92].  This framework needs to be 
extended with the addition of security as a dimension.  
• Integrity of security information.  If the security level can be replaced by a different security 
level (e.g. replacing u1 John by u2 John), we would compromise the integrity of security infor-
mation.  This cannot happen in our model because a value is permanently glued to a security 
level, and the two cannot be separated.  However, it can happen in existing models where secu-
rity level is used as a column in a relation.  
• Object ids, type hierarchy and belief consistency.  In recent work we have extended our rela-
tion framework for dimensional data to incorporate type hierarchy and oids without sacrificing 
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other features [CGN93,Ch95].  In case of security model, this has additional potential for us to 
give a cleaner treatment for information drawing from lower users.    
• Pattern matching languages for application development.  Our SQL like languages are 
interesting and fairly powerful, but they do not eliminate the need for embedding SQL in a 
lower level language such as C++.  We have given powerful pattern matching languages for 
temporal and spatial databases [CG94].  The pattern matching languages are tailor designed to 
deal with linguistic peculiarities of different forms of dimensional data and substantially reduce 
the need for embedding SQL in C++.  A pattern matching language can be viewed as a general-
ization of [[AθB]] and be seamlessly integrated with SQL for dimensional data.   Such a lan-
guage needs to be developed for security data from scratch.    
• Incomplete information.  We have given a model for incomplete information for temporal 
databases [BG92].  We expect the model to extend to security all forms of dimensional data, 
including security data.  
• Compatibility with classical databases.  For classical user of a classical database, the dimen-
sional space degenerates into a single point.   In case of security data, this point is λ.  When 
there is only one point in a dimensional space, the construct [[AθB]] reduces to AθB and the 
distinction between the restricted_to and where clauses disappears.  Therefore, for such a user, 
the restricted_to clauses can be suppressed, and a dimensional algebra can be made to look like 
classical algebra [BG93].  In this way we achieve the full compatibility with the classical data-
bases.  
